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ABSTRACT. A major challenge to legislators, insurance providers and municipalities will be how to 
manage the reimbursement of health -care on partially open markets under increasing fiscal pre s-
sure and an aging population. Although efficiency theoretically can be obtained by private 
solutions using fixed-payment schemes, the informational rents and productio n distortions may 
limit their implementation. The healthcare agency problem is characterized by (i) a complex multi -
input multi-output technology, (ii) information uncertainty and asymmetry, and (iii) fuzzy social 
preferences. First, the technology, inhere ntly nonlinear and with externalities between factors, yield 
parametric estimation difficult. However, the flexible production structure in Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) offers a solution that allows for the gradual and successive refinement of pote n-
tially nonconvex technologies. Second, the information structure of healthcare suggests a context 
of considerable asymmetric information and considerable uncertainty about the underlying tec h-
nology, but limited uncertainty or noise in the registration of the o utcome. Again, we shall argue 
that the DEA dynamic yardsticks (Bogetoft, 1994, 1997, Agrell and Bogetoft, 2001) are suitable for 
such contexts. A third important characteristic of the health sector is the somewhat fuzzy social 
priorities and the numerous p otential conflicts between the stakeholders in the health system. S o-
cial preferences are likely dynamic and contingent on the disclosed information. Similarly, there are 
several potential hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information (adverse selecti on) conflicts 
between the different agents in the health system. The flexible and transparent response to prefe r-
ential ambiguity is one of the strongest justifications for a DEA -approach. DEA yardstick regimes 
have been successfully implemented in other se ctors (electricity distribution) and we present an 
operalization of the power -parameter r in an pseudo-competitive setting that both limits the i n-
formational rents and incites the truthful revelation of information. Recent work (Agrell and 
Bogetoft, 2002) on strategic implementation of DEA yardsticks is commented in the healthcare 
context, where social priorities change the tradeoff between the motivation and coordination fun c-
tions of the yardstick. The paper is closed with policy recommendations and some a reas of further 
work. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since it was first proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes(1978,79), Data Envelopment 
Analyses (DEA) has become a tremendously popular rel ative performance evaluation tool. The 
collection of studies in the Journal of Health Economics, including early contributions like Gra n-
neman, Brown and Pauly(1986) and Grosskopf and Valdmanis(1987), is only the tip of the 
iceberg. A recent bibliographic survey (www.deazone.com) identified more than 1000 papers 
from all sectors of society. Many of these have been published in high quality international 
journals within economics as well as management science and operations research.  
Currently, DEA is also used as the basis for regulation regimes in different areas. In particular, 
it has been used in incentive regulation of private, semi -private and public utilities. In the reg u-
lation of electricity distribution, for example, countries like Norway,  Holland, a nd Finland  
have introduced DEA based revenue and price cap systems, and DEA has   ￿ together with 
more traditional statistical methods  ￿ been used to determine reasonable cost norms in cou n-
tries like Australia, England, New Zealand and Sw eden. 
Thus, it is natural to ask whether a DEA based reimbursement scheme would be useful in the 
design of incentives for the health sector as well.  
RECOGNIZED NEED FOR INCENTIVES 
The need is definitely there. It derives from, among other factors, the ever increasing medic al 
costs, the ￿ partly supply driven ￿ surging demand for health care, and the considerable info r-
mational asymmetry between providers and sponsors of health services.  
In addition, the need for regulation is recognized. Relative performance evaluations, yar dsticks 
and performance based reimbursement schemes have long been employed in the health sector.  
In USA,  Medicare (covering elderly and disabled) as well as insurance companies before 1982 
reimbursed private hospitals retrospectively based on charges for  specific services (fee-for-
service). This provided little cost reduction incentives and was  - during the eighties - substi-
tuted by a system where hospitals￿ reimbursements are determined prospectively based on 
predetermined prices. Patients in the same Di agnosis Related Group (DRG) are expected to 
consume similar resources. DRGs can therefore be used to standardize the differences in the 
case mix of hospitals and thus allow comparisons of hospital efficiency. Also, DRGs can be 
used as the basis for a prosp ective payment system. Paying to a DRG unit is effectively a pa y-
ment for a package of services (medieval treatment, nurse care, laboratory tests etc) and by 
using federal or national rates rather than local rates, the incentives for a hospital will be to 
provide the ￿package￿ at least possible cost.  
In many national health care systems, funding has originally been input based using detailed 
control of the numbers and types of staff as well as different categories of other expenditures. 
To improve the incentives, more aggregate control has also been introduced. They may involve 
defined targets to the hospitals and letting funding be provided in a single category (global 
budget). More recently, several countries have substituted the input based control approac h 
with an output or activity based one. In the activity based prospective payment system, hosp i-
tals recover at least part of their costs using standard rates for different categories of patients. AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  3
Often, some version of a DRG system is used to group the act ivities and hereby account for 
differences in the case mix. 
In short, it is fair to say that there is a recognized need for appropriate performance evalu a-
tions and regulatory mechanisms in the health sector. The conception, evaluation and 
characterization  of such systems from an empirical or theoretical economic viewpoint have 
also attracted a fair amount of interest from the academic community. Hence, we suppress the 
more general discussion on regulatory design to focus attention a one particular regulator y ap-
proach.  
DEA BASED INCENTIVE REGULATION ? 
The crucial next question is whether the existing systems actually can be improved by using 
DEA based evaluations and incentives.  
Assuming that the hospitals are privately owned and efficiently managed, a DRG b ased PPS 
system using federal or national rates will provide incentives to deliver the services at the least 
possible costs. The question is however if it provides such incentives at the least possible cost? 
Albeit efficient, the hospitals may end up earni ng excessive information rents paid by the users 
or purchasers. Also, the structural development of the sector may be adversely affected by the 
system such that both health providers and health purchasers end off in a sub optimal situ a-
tion. 
To discuss potential improvements, we needs to be more specific about the context, i.e. about 
(i) the technology, (ii) the information uncertainty and asymmetry, and (iii) the motivations of 
the actors. 
One contextual characteristic of the health sector is its quite  complex technology. By this we mean 
that it is difficult to set up technical engineering models and norms of what can be acco m-
plished given a set of resources. In particular, there is no reason to expect simple linear 
relationships between the activities. The  possibilities to substitute one activity for another may 
depend on the activity level and there may be considerable positive and negative synergies b e-
tween the different health products. Hence, the cost structure may not be additive. There may 
be lots of joints costs that one cannot easily allocate on the different products. As we shall a r-
gue, the flexibility of the DEA model may prove handy here.  
A second characteristic is the uncertainty and asymmetric information. The uncertainty is related to 
the obvious stochastic influence on the provision of health care. On the other hand, the nu m-
ber of cases handled and the general quality of the data available in most developed countries 
suggest that uncertainty in the usual statistical sense is probably less import ant. It is then the 
asymmetry of the information rather than its quality that is key to the problem. The asymme t-
ric information relates to the behavior of the agents and the precise nature of their working 
conditions.  It is therefore important to investig ate how to provide incentives in the context of 
considerable asymmetric information and considerable uncertainty about the underlying tec h-
nology but limited uncertainty or noise in the registration of the outcome. Again, we shall 
argue that DEA is suitable for such contexts. DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  4
A third important characteristic of the health sector is the somewhat  fuzzy social priorities and the 
numerous potential conflicts between the stakeholders in the health system. It is difficult and 
often politically sensitive to make explicit trade offs between different medical conditions. 
Moreover, the preferences are most likely dynamic and contingent on the possibilities, i.e. the 
ability to cure one or the other condition will influence the valuation attached to the outcome. 
Similarly, there are several potential hidden action (moral  hazard) and hidden information (ad-
verse selection) conflicts between the different agents in the health system. Professional 
medical ethics in combination with incomplete contracts with staff may also g ive raise to com-
plex conflicts of interest between clients, medical staff, management and sponsors. The 
classical economic conflict is between the rentseeking provider, wanting a high compensation, 
and the cost minimizing clients/purchasers, wanting a low pay ment.  We shall focus on this 
basic conflict below, but we note that several other conflicts prevail inside the groups of pr o-
viders and purchasers. At the provider side, conflicts of interest between the management and 
the medical staff may significantly affect the costs of implementing cost saving procedures. 
Similarly, the potential conflicts between the purchasers of health, e.g. the state or insurance 
company, and the final level users of the health service, the insured citizen, may limit the ability 
to control the providers. The user will typically demand the best possible treatment irrespe c-
tively of cost, while the sponsor will be concerned about the associated costs. Medical staff 
may obtain rents from this conflict by overproviding healthcare to low -effort clients, while dis-
couraging (balking) clients with above -norm expected cost. It is important to investigate how 
to handle at least some of these conflicts most efficiently within a context of asymmetric i n-
formation and a complex technology. To cope  with these problems, DEA allows a variety of 
underlying social value functions. The flexible and transparent response to preferential ambig u-
ity is one of the strongest justifications for a DEA-approach. 
OUTLINE 
Below we examine the properties and usefulnes s of DEA based evaluations and incentives in a 
context with a complex technology, acceptable data quality but non -negible information 
asymmetry, unclear social priorities and conflicts of interest among the involved agents.  
We first give a non-technical introduction to DEA in Section 2. In Section 3, we briefly discuss 
why DEA has become popular among regulators and some caveats for its regulatory utiliz a-
tion. To explain more convincingly the strengths and weaknesses of DEA in regulation, we 
offer a survey of the main theoretical results in Section 3. Attention is paid to conditions for 
DEA giving optimal incentive and mechanism design with DEA under various settings. Some 
final remarks and suggestions for future work close the paper in Section 5.  
2. DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
In this Section, we provide a non -technical introduction to the main ideas and constructs in 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). For a text -book introduction to DEA, see Charnes, Co o-
per, Lewin and Seiford (1994), Coelli, Rao and Battese  (1998) or Cooper Seiford and 
Tone (2000).  AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  5
RATIONAL IDEAL EVALUATIONS 
Consider the problem of evaluating a given production unit or production plan. In the DEA 
literature, the evaluated units, hospitals, clinics or even individual physicians, are usually ca lled 
Decision Making Units (DMUs). One can think of the DMUs as actual organizational units, as 
production plans or more generally as multiple dimensional performance descriptions at a 
given time. Note that there is no technical difference between times se ries and panel data in 
the DEA framework, past performance of a unit may also be used to evaluate current activ ity. 
A DMU is characterized by transforming resources into products and services. The transfo r-
mation is affected by non-controllable variables as well as non-observable skills and efforts in 
the organization. The inputs in a hospital study could for example be the number of bed -days, 
physicians, nurses, non-sanitary personnel and the available equipment. The outputs might i n-
clude the number of patient days in different sections of the hospital, the number of surgical 
interventions, the number and length of ambulatory visits. In a more detailed study, the output 
could include also the number of DRG activities delivered. The non -controllable variables will 
depend on the time horizon etc but could include large parts of the fixed costs, medical status 
of admitted patients, and the demographic, medical and socio -economic status of the region 
served by the hospital. We note that establishing a relevant sy stem description of hospital pro-
duction is not an easy task. Indeed,  Newhouse (1994) has argued that the difficulties of 
measuring output appropriately and the inability to handle the quality dimension satisfactorily 
make efficiency studies doubtful at best . We acknowledge these concerns but suggest that they 
may not be more severe than in some other service industries. Also, using a detailed DRG 
based description combined with a minimum of  a priori information about the relative prices of 
the outputs like in Olesen and Petersen (2001) or Chillingerian (1995) can in fact lead to useful 
insights. 
From a standard micro-economic stance, the performance of a given DMU is defined by its 
ability to choose the best means to pursue its aims. The rational ideal perfor mance evaluation, 
viz. the absolute effectiveness evaluation, may be summarized by comparing the actually a t-
tained goal level to the maximally attainable goal level. Figure 1 below illustrates this idea at a 
given level of input and exogenous influence.  
In real evaluations, it is not entirely easy to apply the micro -economic cookbook recipe. In the 
typical evaluation we lack clear priorities  U as well as clear information about the production 
possibilities T.  DEA provides a way to overcome these fundamenta l practical problems. The 
approach is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
FROM EFFECTIVENESS TO  EFFICIENCY 
Consider first the lack of clear priorities concerning how the resource expended and the products 
created should be evaluated and traded -off relative to each other. In Figures 1 and 2 this corr e-
sponds to the U function with the indicated linear indifference curves. The lack of priority 
information includes the problem of resource allocation for the treatment of patients with di f-
ferent diagnoses and the prob lem of maximum allocation for a given admitted patient. DEA 
overcomes this problem by moving from an evaluation of  effectiveness, i.e. goal attainment, to an 
evaluation of efficiency. Efficiency is here broadly defined as the production of the maxmium DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  6
output using the minimum input. The efficient plans in Figure 1 are all the plans on the north -
east frontier. 
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Figure 1   The rational ideal evaluation model given preferences  U(.). 
To quantify the extent of inefficiency, the DEA lite rature uses different measures of the di s-
tance between a given DMU, say DMU  D, and the frontier of efficient plans. Most studies uses 
the so-called Farrell (1957) measures that take into account the multiple dimensional character 
of the inputs and outputs by looking for proportional expansions and contractions. The  Farrell 
output and input based measures are verbally defined as: 
F  = largest proportional expansion of all outputs that is possible without using add itional input 
E = largest proportional contr action of all inputs that is possible without reducing any ou tput. 
 
The interpretation is straightforward.  E.g.,  F = 1.2 means that all output could be increased by 
20% while E = 0.6 means that all inputs could have been reduce with 40%. In Figure 1, the 
Farrell base output efficiency is approximately 200% meaning that all outputs could have i n-
creased by 100% without introducing additional inputs, namely by moving from  D to the 
Farrell projection plan D
F. 
The rationale behind the evaluations may be interpr eted in the following manner. The lack of 
priori information about the social priorities is overcome by  choosing the priorities that puts the 
evaluated DMU in best possible light. For DMU D in Figure 1 this would be the priorities corr e-
sponding to the stipulated preference structure U
D. Hence, in DEA, each and every DMU, say 
hospitals, are evaluated according to prices or priorities that makes its effectiveness look as 
high as possible. The lack of knowledge about priorities is handled by allowing for all p ossible 
priorities corresponding to all possible slopes of the indifference curves in Figure 1.  Optional 
access to ordinal or cardinal preference information may be used to refine the evaluations 
within the model. E.g., assume that consensus can be reache d in Figure 1 upon the lesser value 
of a knee operation compared to a heart surgery. Consequently, the slope of the admissible 
evaluations, or lines one can stipulate must be smaller (less steep) than   ￿1. AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  7
FROM ABSOLUTE EFFICIENCY TO RELATIVE EFFICIENCY 
Consider next the other fundamental problem in practice, namely the  lack of sufficient a priori 
information about the underlying, potentially complex technology . In Figure 1 this corresponds to the set 
T reflecting the technology in a broad sense, i.e. the s ocio-technical possibilities to transform 
combinations of inputs into combinations of outputs. DEA overcomes this problem by est i-
mating the technology T* from observed historical or cross-sectional actual plans.  
Performance is then not evaluated relative  to an absolute norm but rather relative to the pe r-
formance of other DMUs. 
The idea of substituting an underlying but unknown production possibility set with an est i-
mated one is of course not unique to the DEA approach. It is done also in performance 
evaluations using traditional statistical methods, accounting approaches etc. What is particular 
about the DEA approach is the way the approximation of the technology is constructed and 
the resulting properties of the evaluations.  
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Figure 2   The DEA approach to effectiveness, efficiency and relative efficiency.  
The technology is estimated in accordance with the  minimal extrapolation principle. By this we 
mean that DEA constructs the smallest possible set of production plans that constra int the 
observed ones and satisfy a set of (weak) regularity conditions. By constructing the smallest set 
containing the actual observations, the method extrapolates the least.  
The minimal extrapolation principle is illustrated  in Figure 1 by the set below the dotted line. 
Effectiveness, if we know the priorities  U, or efficiency F, in absence of U, can now be evalu-
ated relative to T* rather than T. Since we evaluate compared to an empirical norm set by the 
other DMUs and do not compare to an absolute norm , we say that we evaluate relative effe c-
tiveness or efficiency. In the case of DMU D, the relative efficiency is now approximately 1.3 
suggesting only a 30% improvement potential since we now compare to the point D
RF. DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  8
Different DEA models are distinguished  by the set of regularities imposed on the set  T* in 
addition to the requirement that T* contains the data.  The three most often used assumptions 
are free disposability, convexity and  s-returns to scale: 
  A1: Free disposability, i.e. the ability to produ ce less output using less input 
  A2: Convexity, i.e. the ability to make weighted averages of production plans, and  
  A3: s-Return to scale, i.e. the ability to scale up and down (crs), only down (drs) or not at all (vrs).  
The four most commonly used DEA  models are the original constant returns to scale (crs) 
DEA model proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978, 1979) invoking A1, A2 and 
A3(crs), the decreasing returns to scale (drs) and (local) variable returns to scale (vrs) models 
developed by Banker (1984) and Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) under A1, A2 and 
A3(drs) and A1, A2 and A3(vrs), respectively, and the  free disposability hull (fdh) model pro-
posed by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984) by invoking only A1. The resulting  models in a 
single input single output case are  illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
In the multiple output case the vrs, drs and crs models could look like the  T* technology in 
Figure 1 while the fdh technology would correspond to a step -function between the points A, 
B, C and E. 
To understand the flexibility of the DEA approach it is worthwhile to note that the fdh model 
merely assumes that production and cost functions are increasing. The vrs model modestly a s-
sumes that production functions are increasing and concave and that cost f unctions are 
increasing and convex. The remaining models add the scaling possibilities but even the crs 
model is much more flexible than a linear model (given multiple inputs or ou tputs) 
To summarize, DEA convincingly addresses two fundamental problems in  practical evalua-
tions. The lack of clear preference or priority information is handled by moving from 
effectiveness to efficiency and the lack of  a priori technological information is handled by ma k-
ing weak a priori assumptions, by estimating using the min imal extrapolation principle, and by 
evaluating efficiency relative to be best practice.  
3. WHY IS DEA SO POPULAR? 
We have argued that relative performance evaluations in regulation are advantageous in several 
sectors, including the health sector. We have  also described how DEA solves some of the fu n-
damental information asymmetry problems in real evaluations. We shall now look a little closer 
at some of the implied pros and cons of DEA.  
CAUTIOUS IMPROVEMENT ESTIMATES? 
The way we estimate the production po ssibilities in DEA has several implications. The use of 
the minimal set containing the observations suggests that  DEA provides an inner approxim a-AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  9
tion of the underlying production possibility set. The efficiency estimates are therefore conse r-
vative in the sense that the potential output expansions or input savings are underest imated. 
We have already seen this for DMU  D in Figure 1 where the expansion possibility was est i-
mated to 30% with T* and to 100% with T.  It is said that DEA by means of the minimal 
approximation and the construction of an inner approximation generates  conservative or cautious 


































Figure 3.   The free disposable hull (fdh), variable returns -to-scale (vrs), decreasing returns -to-scale (drs) and 
constant returns-to-scale (crs) technologies for DMU A, B, C, D, E . 
BEST PRACTICE 
The use of the minimal extrapolation principle and hereby the construction of the largest inner 
or smallest outer approximation also imply that the technology identifies the so -called best prac-
tice. The DEA approach captures what the units having performed the best  - using the least 
inputs to produce the largest amounts of outputs  ￿ have been able to achieve. This is attractive 
in many settings since the methods and procedures of the best units are more likely  targets to 
other units. Thus, for example if  D in Figure 1 is to learn, it would probably find little to learn 
from looking at F. It would be more interesting to inquire what units like  B and perhaps E 
have done differently. A further consequence of using  the DEA approach is that real peers are 
identified. In Figure 1, the unit D has two peers, B and E since D
RF is located on the line be-
tween these two units. B is the primary peer since D
FR is located close to B. Of course, the 
construction of best practice norms should also influence the way we design a possible ince n-
tive scheme.  DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  10 
FLEXIBLE PRODUCTION STRUCTURES 
The third and in many cases most important implication of the DEA estimation approach is its 
ability to work with weak a priori assumptions and fl exible production opportunity models. DEA models 
generally allows for the underlying best practice production structure to take many different 
forms. If we estimate a cost function using DEA for example, we may assume that it is simply 
any increasing function ￿ or any increasing convex function. We do not need to assume that 
the substitution possibilities between the outputs are fixed for example. No parametric statist i-
cal model or accounting cost function allow for a similar flexibility in the technology.  There are 
many versions of the DEA approach corresponding to the introduction of different combin a-
tions of a priori assumptions. In all cases, however, the imposed  a priori structure is mild 
compared to competing approaches.  
NOISE OR EFFICIENCY 
The single most problematic feature of DEA is the risk of mistaking noise for efficiency or 
inefficiency. And similarly, to mistake best practice for  most lucky practice. 
If a DMU by chance faces particularly favourable circumstances, not accounted for in the 
model, or if the registration of the outputs by luck (or intent) is biased upwards and the inputs 
downwards, the unit will appear to have performed particularly well and have little or no ine f-
ficiency. Similarly, there is a risk of non -favorable circumstances or registrations leading to 
groundless accusations of inefficiency in a DEA analysis. The first case is particularly proble m-
atic since it might influence the evaluation of others that may now face tougher standards by 
being compared to a unit with a wind fall gain. 
These observations have lead some theorists as well as practitioners to question DEA and to 
forward the use of statistical methods, including so -called stochastically frontier analyses SFA. 
SFA is like a traditional statistical model except that  the noise is composed of two terms, a one 
sided efficiency terms and a two sided traditional noise term.  
The consultants￿ answers to these problems  ￿ unless they have worked for firms chal lenging 
the DEA regulation ￿ have usually been optimistic. They might claim that ￿DEA puts every-
one in their best light￿ or even that  ￿DEA bends itself backwards to make everyone look as 
good as possible.￿ Some theoretical basis for these answers exists as we have seen, namely in 
the weak a priory regulatory imposed, the  minimal extrapolation principle applied and in the 
interpretation of efficiency as allowing each DMU to choose its own priorities.  
On the other hand, this is of course only part of the story. The inclusion of all relevant factors 
and the exclusion of any noise in the registration of performance are seldom guaranteed in any 
formal model, DEA not being an exception.  
As any other operations research technique, DEA is just a tool that can be used with success if 
put in the right hands and used sensibly. To be  well executed, a DEA analysis must involve 
careful data collection, serious sensitivity analysis (using Monte Carlo techniques, peeling tec h-
niques, testing alternative technologies etc), perhaps stochastic programming and if possible 
hypothesis testing. Unfortunately, the statistical theory underlying DEA is not fully developed 
to eliminate the impact of noisy registrations. There are by now numerous contributions (i n-AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  11
volving sensitivity analysis, stochastic programming, resembling, bootstrapping, and asympto tic 
test theory, cf. for example Simar and  Wilson (2000) for a recent survey) but the state of the art 
is still lacking compared to what can be done in a parametric models.  
The theorists￿ answer would therefore be more cautious. The appropriateness of DEA d e-
pends to a large extent on how it is applied and for which purposes. Careful decision analysis 
can determine whether the underlying assumptions regarding the controllability of perfor m-
ance are undermining the viability of the incentive system. Despite the  likely entangling of 
efficiency and noise in any analysis, its consequences may be moderated by choice of variables, 
aggregation unit and sensitivity analysis.  
In a regulatory context, it will usually be the regulators discretion how much inefficiency to 
eliminate in the coming periods, cf. also below. In such case, by acting generous, he may effe c-
tively create a safeguard against noise.  
Further, given the flexibility in the production structure, individual noise or outlier problem 
may only have local impacts. 
Finally, the impact of noisy registrations and mis -specified models should be also be viewed 
against the uncertainty associated with the underlying (mean) production structure. With sparse 
a priori information about a potentially complex technology,  the DEA approach offers clear 
advantages over parametric statistical methods and mechanic a ccounting models. 
Figure 4 below illustrates the differences with respect to best practice identification, flexibility 
of the model, and the handling of noise in a  technical (￿true￿) benchmarking approach, a DEA 
approach and an econometric approach.  
Intuitively, it seems natural to conclude that if one faces a simple technology and very noisy 
data, the use of parametric statistical models are preferable from an infer ence perspective. If 
on the other hand, we have access to relatively high quality data but a complex technology with 
considerable uncertainty about the structure of the input -output correspondences (the rates of 
substitution etc), DEA is preferable.   
More formal models of the comparative advantages of DEA in regulation in presence of co n-
siderable structural uncertainty will be surveyed below. 
EASY TO USE AND DEFEND? 
A couple of more pragmatic observations are relevant here as well.  
DEA is easy to use given the existing software, the limited  a priori assumptions needed and￿ 
somewhat counterintuitive ￿ the lack of good standard indicators of model mis -specification! 
Moreover, DEA may also be considered easy to justify. Again, this rests on the mild regularity  
assumptions, the ability to handle multiple inputs and outputs and its clear connection to pr o-
duction theory. Albeit informative in a collaborative setting, the identification of explicit peers 
actually opens the model for criticism. If for example a regu lated firm appeals the regulator￿s 
decision in court, the existence of explicit peers limits the burden of proof on the firm. Rather DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  12 
than having to invalidate the entire sample, as in an econometric model, the DEA -regulated 
firm concentrates on a few selected comparators. The statistical ￿black -box￿ approach gives 
the regulator a strategic advantage. Hence, although transparency and managerial informativ e-
ness are virtues of any formal method, it does prompt for strategic behavior in regulation. 
Also, the risk possibly entangling slack and noise, inefficiency and noise, may make the DEA 











Figure 4.   Alternative Benchmarking Approaches  
PREFERENCE INFORMATION AGAIN 
A second drawback of the DEA approach, as of  efficiency studies in general is the  lack of focus 
on organizational objectives. The impressing progress that can be made in the evaluation without 
much preference information should not lead one to forget that importance of ￿doing the 
right things￿ and not just ￿doing things right￿. It may be preferable to move slowly in the right 
direction than to run fast in the wrong direction The importance and potential gains from gi v-
ing more attention to preference modeling and less to the evaluation with possibly n a￿ve 
priorities have been emphasized in the multiple criteria literature, cf. Bogetoft and Pr uzan 
(1991) and have gradually been included into the DEA literature as well, cf. e.g. Ali, Cook and 
Seiford (1991), Golany  (1988a,b), Halme, Joro, Korhonen and Walle nius (1999), and Joro, 
Korhonen and Wallenius (1998). 
PROS AND CONS OF DEA 
To summarize our discussion, we have identified a series of strengths and weaknesses of DEA.   
The strengths include 
•  Requires no or little preference, price or priority information  
•  Requires no or little technological information  AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  13
•  Makes weak a priori assumptions 
•  Handles multiple inputs and multiple outputs  
•  Provides reel peers 
•  Identifies best practice  
•  Cautious or conservative evaluations (minimal extrapolation)  
•  Supports learning and  - as we shall argue in the next Section  - planning and motivation  
The weaknesses include 
•  Relatively weak theory of significance testing (sensitivity, resampling, bootstrapping, asymptotic theory)  
•  Lack of focus of goals   
4. LESSONS FROM THEORY 
We now give a survey of the main results about incentive provision using DEA analysis.   
Formal analysis of the likely usefulness of DEA in incentive provision was initiated by Prof. 
Peter Bogetoft in 1990. The present survey gives a non -technical introduction to a series of 
papers ￿ often somewhat technical -￿ written primarily by Bogetoft and his associates. The 
main results concern the use of so -called super-efficiency, the design of static incentives and 
the design of dynamic incentives in context with considerable technol ogical uncertainty and 
asymmetric information about a regulated agent￿s actions (moral hazard) and working cond i-
tions (adverse selection). We commence with a few words about the research approach.  
THE BASIC PROBLEM AND CONTEXT 
The basic problem addressed in this literature is the following: Given a cross section, a time 
series or panel information on the multiple inputs and outputs used by n DMUs  
(inputs
i, outputs
i) for DMUs i=1,￿,n 
what should we ask the DMUs to do in the future, how should we motivate and  compensate 
them for their private costs ? 
The answer to these questions depends intimately on the organizational  context and in particular 
on the technological, informational and preferential assumptions of the parties, i.e. the regul a-
tor (principal) and DMUs (agents). 
In general, we consider the case where the principal (regulator) faces considerable  uncertainty 
about the technology. In a single input multiple output cost setting he may for example know that 
the cost function is increasing and convex, but  otherwise have no a priori information about 
the cost structure. In the pure moral hazard models, we also assume that the agents face a sim i-
lar uncertainty. 
The general case also empowers agents to take private actions, which the principal cannot ob-
serve. The action could for example be to reduce costs or increase the quality of the work 
done. This leads to a usual moral hazard problem since the principal and the agents may conflict 
as to which actions the agents should take. The traditional setting depicts  the agents as work DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  14 
averse, tempted to rely on their good luck and to explain possibly bad performances with u n-
favorable circumstances. In general, however, it is simply one way to model the underlying 
conflicts giving rise to a motivation problem. However , the zealous physician who pledges his 
Hippocratic oath by providing top -class treatment to any and all patients illustrates another 
moral hazard. The conflict might also be that the medical staff have diverging preferences that 
induce them to work (too) hard, to treat (groups of) patients below cost and to accomodate the 
patients￿ desire to undergo multiple  treatments. 
In some models, we also consider the possibility that the agents have  superior information about 
the working conditions before contractin g with the principal. A hospital manager may for e x-
ample have good information about the primary cost drivers at his hospital while the Ministry 
of Health may have little information about what causes the total bill to increase. This leads to 
the classical adverse selection problem where an agent will try to extract information rents by clai m-
ing to be under less favorable conditions.  
As regards the specific preference of the parties, we generally assume that the principal is risk 
neutral and that the agent is either risk averse or risk neutral. The principal￿s aim is to minimize 
the costs of inducing the agent to take the desired (hidden) actions in the relevant (hidden) ci r-
cumstances. An agent￿s aim is usually to maximize the utility from payment minus the  disutility 
form private effort. In the combined moral hazard and adverse selection models, we usually 
make a simplifying assumption about the structure of the agent￿s trade offs between effort and 
payment. We assume that his aim is to maximize a weighted  sum of profit and slack: 
DMU￿s Utility  = Utility from Pa yment￿ Cost of Effort 
             = Profit + r ￿Slack 
where slack is a measure of the extent to which input utilization exceeds the minimal possible 
and where 1 ‡ r ‡ 0 is the relative value of slack 
The general set-up and timeline is illustrated in Figure 5 below.  
SUPER EFFICIENCY 
The first simple lesson is that it is important to modify the simple Farrell measure slightly for 
use in incentive regulation. 
The Farrell measures E and F give all units on the relative efficient frontier a score of 1. This 
severely limits the ability to give high-powered incentives based on Farrell measures. As de m-
onstrated in particular in Bogetoft (1990,1994a and 1995) in a simple moral hazard context, the 
Farrell measures can give incentives to match others, but not to surpass the norm and push out 
the frontier. Combining this with the multiple dimensional character of the typical DEA model 
and hereby with the ability to be special in different ways, the Nash Equilibria ( NE) that can 
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Figure 5.   Agency Structure with Timeline of Events.  
Figure 6 below illustrates this. Assume that the cost to the agents are proportional to the 
length of the production vectors and that payment is decreasing in the  F score such that 
maximal payment is received when a DMU is efficient with a score of  F =1. Now if DMU 1, 
planned to produce at A, moves from A to C, he would get the same payment but supply  less 
effort. Doing A is therefore not a best response. Next, DMU 2 could move from the planned 
B to a more easy life in D, again reducing his private costs of effort without affecting his pa y-
ment. This procedure can continue until they both supply the min imal effort and receive the 








Figure 6.   Incentive Provision with Efficiency and Super Efficiency  
This somewhat discouraging outcome can easily be remedied. By eliminating the evaluated unit 
from the set of comparators, one can measure th e so-called super-efficiency of frontier units. DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  16 
This was suggested by Andersen and Petersen  (1993) as a means to differentiate among fro n-
tier units. Presently, it is motivated by a desire to provide incentives. The super -efficiency 
measure on the inputs side, E
SUPER, can now be larger than one.  A score of for example 
E
SUPER = 1.2 suggests that the DMU could have increased all of its inputs with 20% and still 
have been efficient. Similarly, a super-efficiency score on the output side of F
SUPER = 0.9 sug-
gests that the DMU could have reduced all of its outputs with 10% and still have been on the 
frontier. In Figure 6, the output based super efficiency for DMU 1 in A is approximately 0.6 
but if the payment is sufficiently decreasing in  F
SUPER, it would not pay to reduce the effort. 
Indeed, its does not pay to reduce the effort if the marginal reduction in payment exceeds the 
marginal decease in the cost of effort.  
More generally, using super-efficiency, it turns out that one can support the implementation of 
most plans ￿ even in so-called un-dominated Nash-equilibria. 
All the papers discussed here use super -efficiency as the basis for designing contracts.   
It is worthwhile to note that if we extend the set-up of the papers considered here by introdu c-
ing more uncertainty, including individual noise terms and a lack of common knowledge 
among the agents being motivated, even traditional efficiency will be able to provide sufficient 
incentives to implement many plans, among those the optimal (cost minimal). The logic i s that 
if an DMU is uncertain about the motives of the other DMU or there is considerable noise in 
the outcome, an agent cannot rely on the fine strategic behavior in Figure 6 because he cannot 
with certainty foresee the results. 
STATIC INCENTIVES WITH  INDIVIDUAL NOISE 
In Bogetoft (1994a, 94b) we considered pure moral hazard contexts with  
•  Considerable technological uncertainty,  
•  Risk averse DMUs 
•  Individual uncertainty (noise) in the DMUs performances.  
The technological uncertainty was represented by a large c lass of a priori possible technologies, 
e.g. the set of productions functions that are increasing and concave or the set of functions 
that are simply increasing. We addressed the question of when the associated DEA based fro n-
tiers, e.g. the vrs frontier or the fdh frontier from Figure 3, contained all the relevant 
information for contracting: 
Optimal Compensation to DMU




i, DEA frontier based on other DMUs)  
This is the case where optimal relative performance evaluations can be made by co mparing the 
performance of a given DMU against the DEA best practice frontier estimated from the pe r-
formance of the other DMUs. 
It turned out that  
•  DEA frontiers support optimal contracts when the distributions of the individual noise terms are exponential  
or truncated, AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  17
•  DEA frontiers based on large samples supports optimal contracts when noise is monotonic in the sense that 
small noise terms are more likely than large.  
Hence, even when we have individual noise elements and not just the structural uncertaint y 
which intuitively seems to favor DEA, will DEA based contacts be optimal for special distr i-
butional assumptions ￿ and for rather general assumptions if the sample is sufficiently large.  
STATIC INCENTIVES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION 
In Bogetoft (1997, 2000) we considered combined adverse selection and moral hazard contexts 
with 
•  Considerable asymmetric information about the technology  
•  Risk neutral DMUs, 
•  DMUs seeking to maximizes {Profit +  r￿Slack}. 
The DMUs are supposed to have superior technological information.  In the extreme case, they 
know the underlying true cost function with certainty while the regulator only knows the ge n-
eral nature of the cost function. Thus for example, the regulator may know that there are fixed 
unit costs of the different outputs but n ot the exact unit cost, being the DMU￿s private info r-
mation. Alternative assumptions may be made about the information available to the regulator. 
We may assume for example that he know simply that the cost function is increasing and co n-
vex. 
The optimal solution in this case depends on whether the actual costs, i.e. the minimal possible 
cost plus the slack introduced by DMU, can or cannot be verified and hence contracted upon.  
If the actual costs cannot be contracted upon, the optimal solution is to use the  following 
revenue cap with non-verifiable cost information 
Optimal Reimbursement B i to DMU i   
= k + CDEA (yi) 
= Lump Sum Payment + DEA -Estimated Cost Norm Based on the Other DMUs  
The size of the lump sum payment depends on the DMU alternatives, including  his profit po-
tentials in other markets or the surplus from contracting with other regulators, say private 
insurance companies. 
If instead we assume that the actual costs of the DMU can be contracted upon, the optimal 
reimbursement scheme becomes  
Optimal Reimbursement B i to DMU i   
= k + ci+ r￿( CDEA(yi) ￿ ci) 
= Lump Sum Payment + Actual Costs   + Fraction  r of DEA-Estimated Cost Savings DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  18 
The structure of this payment schemes can be interpreted as a  DEA based yardstick model: Using 
the performance of the other DMUs, the regulator creates a cost yardstick and the regulated 
DMU is allowed to keep a fraction  r of his saving compared to the yardstick costs as his effe c-
tive compensation. Figure 7 illu strates this reimbursement scheme.   
These results provides an incentive rationale for using DEA based revenue cap systems in co n-
texts where the regulator face considerable uncertainty about the underlying cost structure.  
Several extensions and generalizations of these results are provided in Bogetoft (1997,2000). In 
particular, it is shown how the structure of the schemes are essentially unaffected by introdu c-
ing decentralized decision making (where the DMUs, e.g. the hospitals, decide on the output 
mix) as well as participatory budgeting arrangements. Also, the impact of  introducing genuine 
social benefit functions, alternative costs of slack reduction models, rationing etc is invest i-
gated. 
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Payment = Lump Sum + Actual Cost +  r•Savings   
Figure 7.   The DEA Yardstick Model in the Cost  ￿ Production Space. 
DYNAMIC INCENTIVES WITH  RATCHET AND LIMITED CATCH UP 
In Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind (2000a,b) we extended the above adverse selection and moral 
hazard context by introducing a time dimension. The dynamic  perspective gives rise to new 
issues, including 
•  The possibility to accumulate and use new info rmation 
•  The need to avoid the ratchet effect, i.e. deliberate subperformance in early periods to avoid facing too tough 
standards in the future  
•  The possibility of technical progress (or regress)  
Nevertheless, the structure of the optimal dynamic scheme is  similar to the ones developed 
above. Thus the optimal revenue cap for a DMU is found by a DEA based yardstick norm. 
Assuming verifiable actual costs, the optimal scheme taking into account the generation of new 
information, the ratchet effect and the possi ble technical progress becomes: AGRELL AND BOGETOFT  19
Optimal Reimbursement  Bt
i  to DMU
i in period t  
= k + ct





= Lump Sum Payment + Actual Costs in Period  t 
+ Fraction r of DEA-Estimated Cost Savings in Period  t using all the information  from the 
other DMUs generated in periods 1 through  t. 
In Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind(2000a,b) we have described how to modify the schemes above to 
take into account also the  
•  Possibly limited catch-up capacity, i.e. the fact that it may take time for a DMU to learn the  best practice 
•  Possible cost of innovation (frontier movements) and loss from dissemination (sharing) of i nformation 
STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTS  
Before closing, it is important to emphasize the complexity involved in the design of a regul a-
tion mechanism. We have focused above on how DEA supports to setting of appropriate cost 
norms in a reimbursement scheme. However, this is but one of many relevant concerns. The 
stress is here on the reduction of short run cost via relevant improvements and adaption to 
best practice. In a long run perspective, the restructuring of the industry to optimal scale and 
scope economies may be far more important than such short run concerns. An important 
problem is therefore how alternative short run schemes affect the DMUs incentives  to make 
such adjustment, e.g. through mergers. Another issue of interest is how the regulated DMUs 
through restructuring of the business and accounting procedures may strategically try to adjust 
their structure to the regulatory scheme. Some results on th ese issues are available in Agrell and 
Bogetoft (2001) and Bogetoft and Wang(1999).   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of DEA in the design of activity 
based reimbursement schemes. In particular we have argued that  DEA yardstick schemes may 
be useful in contexts with a complex technology, reasonable precise data, fuzzy social priorities 
and numerous potential conflicts between the regulators and the regulated, as well as conside r-
able amounts of asymmetric information. The potential presence of ambigous or even 
conflicting preference functions, that characterizes health care provision, invalidates some of 
the underlying microeconomic assumptions in contracting. A system based on the flexible 
production structure of DEA may facilitate reimbursement, as well as organizational learning, 
since it allows for alternative preference functions. In the light of recent developments to i n-
corporate dynamic frontier shifts, ratchet effects and innovation, in addition to the classic al 
single-period adverse selection and moral hazard problems, DEA has become a mature co m-
ponent in modern incentive menus. Not a panacea, but certainly benefical if correctly 
administered, as the doctor would say.    DEA-BASED INCENTIVE REGIMES IN HEALTH-CARE PROVISION  20 
LITERATURE 
1.  Agrell, P. and P. Bogetoft, I ncentive Regulation of Swedish Electricity Distributors, Working Papers, 2001  
2.  Agrell, P., P. Bogetoft and J.Tind,  Dynamic DEA Yardsticks in Scandinavian Electricity Distribution, under 
revision for Journal of Productivity Analysis , 2002a. 
3.  Agrell, P., P. Bogetoft and J.Tind, Incentive Plans for Productive Efficiency, Innovation and Learning, 
Int.Journal of Production Economics , 78, 1-11, 2002b. 
4.  Ali, A.I., W.D.Cook and L.M. Seiford, Strict vs. Weak Ordinal Relations for Multipliers in Data Envelopment 
Analysis, Management Science, 37, pp. 733-738, 1991 
5.  Andersen, P. and N.C. Petersen, A Procedure for Ranking Efficient Units in Data Envelop ment Analysis, 
Managements Science, 39, pp.1261 -1264, 1993. 
6.  Bogetoft, P., Strategic Responses to DEA Control, Working Pape r, 1990. 
7.  Bogetoft, P.,  Non-Cooperative Planning Theory , Springer-Verlag, 1994a. 
8.  Bogetoft, P , Incentive Efficient Production Frontiers: An Agency Perspective on DEA,  Management Science, 
40, pp.959-968, 1994b. 
9.  Bogetoft, P, Incentives and Productivity Measu rements, International Journal of Production Economics , 39, pp. 67-
81, 1995. 
10.  Bogetoft, P, DEA -Based Yardstick Competition: The Optimality of Best Practice Regulation,  Annals of Opera-
tions Research, 73, pp. 277-298, 1997. 
11.  Bogetoft, P., DEA and Activity Plan ning under Asymmetric Information,   Journal of Productivity Analysis , 13, 
pp. 7-48, 2000. 
12.  Bogetoft, P. and P. Pruzan,  Planning with Multiple Criteria , North-Holland, 1991.  
13.  Bogetoft, P. and D. Wang, Estimating the Potential Gains from Mergers, Working Pape r, 1999. 
14.  Charnes, A., W. Cooper, A.Y.Lewin and L.M.Seiford,  Data Envelopment Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Appl i-
cation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.  
15.  Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes, Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units,  European 
Journal of Operational Research , 2, pp. 429-444, 1978. 
16.  Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes, Short Communication: Measuring the Efficiency of Decision 
Making Units, European Journal of Opera tional Research, 3, pp. 339, 1979. 
1.  Chilingerian, J. A. (1995)  Evaluating Physician Efficiency in Hospitals: A Multivariate Analysis of Best Pra c-
tice. European Journal of Operational Research,  80(3), 548-574. 
17.  Coelli, T., D.S.Prasada Rao, and G. Battese,   An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis , Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1998. 
18.  Cooper, W.W., L.M.Seiford, and K.Tone,  Data Envelopment Analysis , Kluwer Academic Pu blishers, 2000. 
19.  Deprins, D., D. Simar, and H. Tulkens, Measuring Labor Efficiency in Post Offices, pp. 243 -267 in M. Marchand, 
P. Pestieau, and H. Tulkens, "The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurements ", North Holland, 1984. 
20.  Farrell, M.J. , The measurement of productive efficiency,  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , Series A, III, pp. 
253-290, 1957. 
21.  Golany, B., A Note on  Including Ordinal Relations Among Multipliers in Data Envelopment Analysis,  Manage-
ment Science, 34, pp. 1029-1033, 1988a. 
22.  Golany, B., An Interactive MOLP Procedure for Extension of DEA to Effectiveness Analysis,  Journal of Opera-
tional Research Society, 39, pp. 725-734, 1988b. 
23.  Granneman, T., R.S. Brown and M.V.Pauly, Estimating Hospital Costs: A Multiple -Output Analysis, Journal of 
Health Economics, 5, pp. 107-128, 1986. 
24.  Grosskopf, S.  and V. Valdmanis, Measuring Hospital Performance: A Non -Parametric Appro ach, Journal of 
Health Economics, 6, pp. 89-107, 1987. 
25.  Halme, M., T.Joro, P.Korhonen, S.Salo and J.Wallenius, A Value Efficiency Approach to Incorporating Pre f-
erence Information in Data Envelopment Analysis,  Management Science , 45, pp. 103-115, 1999. 
26.  Joro, T., P.Korhonen, and J.Wallenius, Structural Comparison of Data Envelopment Analysis and Multiple 
Objective Linear Programming,  Management Science, 44, pp. 962-970, 1998.  
27.  Newhouse, J.P. , Frontier Estimation: How Useful a Tool for Health Economics,  Journal of Health Economics, 
13, pp. 317-322, 1994. 
28.  Olesen, O. and N.C.Petersen, The Use of Data Envelopment Analysis with Probabilistic Assurance Regions 
for Measuring Hospital Efficiency,  Journal of Productivity Analysis , 2001, to appear. 
29.  Simar, L. and P.Wilso n, Statistical Inference in Nonparametric Frontier Models: The State of the Art , Journal 
of Productivity Analysis, 13, pp.- 49-78, 2000. 